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Strategic Insights: Strategic Questions Loom Large for President Trump
in the Middle East
April 11, 2017 | Dr. Christopher J. Bolan
“Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is
the noise before defeat.”
Sun Tzu

The primary shortcoming of U.S. policymakers since the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, has been a consistent inability to translate tactical and operational military successes into
sustainable strategic political outcomes. This was objectively true for both former U.S. Presidents
George W. Bush and Barack Obama as evidenced by the long and tragic history of the continued
conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq that has yielded wholly unsatisfying strategic outcomes. It remains
to be seen if President Donald Trump and his senior officials can successfully reverse this trend.
Doing so will require a long-term strategy that first establishes realistic and attainable objectives
and then skillfully marshals all instruments of national power—military and non-military alike—
to accomplish those goals.
Since the outbreak of civil war in Syria in 2011, U.S. policy in Syria has been vexed by the
inability to either harmonize or prioritize two distinct strategic objectives: (1) the ousting of Syrian
President Bashar al-Assad, who bears primary responsibility for the brutal civil war that has killed
nearly half-a-million people and displaced millions more; and, (2) the destruction and defeat of the
Islamic State in Syria (ISIS), which represents an immediate and existential threat to regional
leaders while posing a distant and marginal threat to U.S. citizens.
As my colleague, Steven Metz, recently wrote in World Politics Review, U.S. Presidents have
often confronted a “dictator dilemma” in foreign policy.1 In the Middle East, this dilemma
manifests itself in the debate over whether supporting authoritarian leaders contrary to American
democratic values is sometimes a necessary evil in pursuit of concrete national interests, such as
battling violent Islamist extremist groups including ISIS.
In Syria, former President Obama had a declaratory policy that rhetorically sought to resolve
this dilemma by calling for both objectives to be accomplished. In reality, however, his policies
emphasized and resourced the fight against ISIS while providing only lip service to the goal of
fostering regime change in Damascus. Perhaps overly buoyed by the ability of the Arab uprisings
to compel the ouster of long-time authoritarian leaders in Tunisia and Egypt in early 2011,
President Obama sought to quickly get on the “right side of history” in condemning Assad’s violent
repression of Syrian protesters. He publicly proclaimed that, “For the sake of the Syrian people,
the time has come for President Assad to step aside.”2 Nevertheless, aside from these lofty political
declarations and imposing some limited and targeted economic sanctions on the regime, President
Obama only reluctantly offered limited military support to carefully vetted non-jihadi opposition
groups. This arm-and-equip program was designed to build a coherent Syrian opposition force, yet
it proved to be an abject failure. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Department of Defense

(DoD) plans to train and equip an opposition force of 15,000, costing the U.S. taxpayers over $500
million, yielded only a handful of recruits that were quickly rolled up by al-Qaeda linked elements
in Syria nearly as soon as they crossed into the country.3 This failure of the train and equip program
confirmed President Obama’s deep doubts about prospects to build a viable moderate and unified
opposition capable of challenging Assad and his backers on the battlefield. The program was
cancelled, this strategic objective was effectively abandoned, and all efforts turned to defeating
ISIS.
While largely abandoning serious efforts to overthrow Assad, President Obama articulated and
executed a balanced and effective strategy that over time has yielded meaningful battlefield
successes against ISIS. His address to the nation in September 2014 on the threat posed by the
Islamic State could have been written by a U.S. Army War College (USAWC) graduate giving
due consideration to the ends (objectives), ways (concepts for employing the instruments of
power), and means (resources) of strategy formulation. The objective was clearly expressed as to
“degrade and ultimately destroy ISIS.”4 The plan called for harnessing all instruments of national
power toward the accomplishment of this strategic goal: diplomatically, the United States would
marshal a “broad coalition of partners,” it would also take measures to “improve our
intelligence,” it would undertake an information campaign to “counter [ISIS’s] warped
ideology,” and it would aggressively interdict the economic resources that sustain ISIS.
Nonetheless, it was also clear that the strategy would give priority to the military instrument of
power by “sending arms and assistance to Iraqi security forces and the Syrian opposition [emphasis
added].” Finally, President Obama recognized that such a strategy would have to be adequately
resourced if it was to succeed and he openly called on Congress to “give us additional authorities
and resources.”5 This strategy has seriously degraded ISIS and brought the United States much
closer to attaining this strategic objective. The coalition campaign has dramatically decreased the
territory held by ISIS in both Iraq and Syria, killed some 180 senior ISIS leaders, significantly
reduced its financial holdings and the flow of foreign fighters, and considerably diminished its
propaganda output.6
At least in the fight against ISIS, former President Obama dealt President Trump a winning
military hand, but not one that guarantees broader strategic success against violent Islamist
extremist groups. The United States has forged an anti-ISIS coalition of more than 60 countries.
More importantly, coalition forces are now poised to liberate the key remaining strongholds of
ISIS in both Mosul (Iraq) and Raqqa (Syria). This would deliver a serious moral and physical blow
to ISIS. Mosul is where the leader of ISIS (Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi) declared his caliphate and the
loss of its hold on these two major cities would lay bare the falsity of his claim to enjoy God’s
good graces. Military defeats in these two cities would shatter the image of invincibility that alBaghdadi seeks to perpetuate as a means to draw additional recruits and inspire donations to his
warped cause. Practically, the loss of these territories will rob ISIS of an important source of
revenue in the form of taxes, bribes, and extortions. As Brookings analyst Ken Pollack warned in
early 2015, however, sudden military victories could lead to a “catastrophic success” if not
accompanied by detailed plans to occupy vacated territory, heal divided societies, and build
effective governance structures capable of meeting peoples basic needs. 7
It will be up to President Trump to capitalize on these military successes against ISIS and
translate them into a meaningful strategic victory that prevents the emergence of other terrorist
groups and offers a modicum of hope for a more stable region. The indications that he and his
administration are up to this challenge are mixed.

President Trump certainly shares former President Obama’s goal of destroying ISIS.
Nonetheless, his administration has sent confusing messages regarding American strategic
objectives in Syria. As recently as March 30, 2017, U.S. Ambassador Nikki Haley at the United
Nations and U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson independently made public statements that the
administration was abandoning even the pretense of President Obama’s goal of removing Assad
from power.8 For a few days, this seemed to clarify that U.S. policy would address the dictator’s
dilemma by clearly prioritizing the fight against terrorism and would consequently tolerate a brutal
authoritarian regime in Damascus in pursuit of that strategic objective. However, the Trump
administration appears to be reversing course in the immediate aftermath of the Assad regime’s
apparent and horrific use of sarin gas on April 4, 2017, killing nearly 100 civilians. On board Air
Force One on April 6th, Secretary Tillerson suggested that regime change was back on the table.
When asked if the United States would be leading a global coalition to oust Assad from power in
the wake of this chemical attack, Secretary Tillerson said that, “Those steps are underway.” 9
With this apparent reversal in U.S. policy, the dictator’s dilemma has returned with a
vengeance to confound U.S. policymakers concerning Syria. What are the U.S. strategic objectives
in Syria, and which objectives have priority over others? Is it the removal of the Assad regime
from power? Is it the destruction of ISIS? Are these objectives mutually exclusive, are they
complementary and supportive, do they work at cross purposes with one another? Moreover, just
how do the recent U.S. cruise missile strikes in Syria that targeted the airfield that launched the
sarin attacks fit into broader U.S. strategy in Syria? Unfortunately, President Trump’s explanation
of the missile strikes does little to clarify U.S. strategic objectives in Syria, because he said they
were related to neither regime change nor the fight against ISIS, but instead designed primarily to
“prevent and deter the spread and use of deadly chemical weapons.” 10 Andrew Exum, a former
Deputy Secretary of Defense for Middle East Policy, argues that while these latest U.S. strikes
might be useful in convincing Russia and others of the need to remove Assad, they might also
“greatly complicate the fight against the Islamic State” since U.S. forces in Syria could become
vulnerable to retaliation from Syria or its military backers.11
Even assuming coalition military success in liberating Mosul and Raqqa, the administration
will need to develop a strategy to translate these operational victories into a sustainable political
outcome that prevents the resurgence of violent Islamist extremist groups and improves prospects
for regional stability. Large segments of Sunni communities in Iraq and Syria remain disaffected
and alienated from their governments, which creates fertile ground for continued conflict and civil
war. It will require herculean diplomatic efforts to press leaders in Baghdad and Damascus to make
necessary political reforms toward more representative governments. It will require the
establishment of judicial institutions that restore the rule of law and the creation of truth and
reconciliations commissions that can help these societies heal deeply felt wounds. Moreover, the
civil wars that have raged in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen have left these countries devastated
with reconstruction costs estimated in Syria alone to exceed $200 billion dollars. 12 The United
States will need to both invest financially and lead international efforts to marshal effective
economic reconstruction efforts. On this score, the administration’s plans to significantly reduce
funding for U.S. foreign assistance programs (already representing less than 1% of the federal
budget) and eliminate U.S. support for many international organizations will handicap the ability
of U.S. agencies to fully employ the non-military instruments of national power and coordinate
the participation of other international partners willing to share these burdens. As Trump’s
Secretary of Defense James Mattis once said to Congress, “If you don’t fund the State Department
fully, then I need to buy more ammunition.”13 Furthermore, the administration will need to move

much more quickly to staff the second and third tiers of the State and Defense departments so that
detailed plans can be developed to synchronize and coordinate these efforts both within the U.S.
interagency and with many U.S. international partners.
It is clear that President Trump inherited difficult strategic challenges in both Syria and Iraq.
These are problems that are now owned by his administration. Developing a long-term strategic
plan that draws strength from American values and employs and adequately resources the
diplomatic, informational, economic, and military instruments of power to accomplish clearly
articulated objectives is a difficult but necessary challenge.
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